The majority (3:2) of the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar chose for public policy reasons deliberately to extend legal causation and with it a claimant's right to recover damages in circumstances where a claimant can prove his doctor's negligent failure to warn of a risk induced him to consent to the index treatment or operation earlier than if he had received an appropriate warning and then suffered injury when the risk of which he should have been warned materialised during the treatment. To recover damages a claimant will no longer have to prove that but for the failure to warn, he would never ever have consented to the same treatment or operation at any time.
On 14 October 2004, the House of Lords (by a sharply divided majority decision of 3:2) upheld the (unanimous) decision of the Court of Appeal in favour of the claimant patient in Chester v Afshar. 1 The judgments of Lords Hope, Steyn and Walker make it clear that they have decided to extend the recoverable boundaries of legal causation beyond the high-water marks of UK legal precedents, including Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 -for reasons of (one assumes) "public" policy.
Until this case was decided in the claimant's favour, the law on legal causation of injury that flowed from a doctor's negligent failure to warn of a risk of treatment was quite restrictively but predictably interpreted by UK courts. The patient had to prove (1) a negligent failure to warn him/her of a risk of serious injury from treatment (2) this failure to warn induced him/ her to accept the treatment that caused him injury (3) if he/she had been appropriately warned he/she would have refused to consent to undergo the treatment at any time ever (4) the index treatment caused him/her to suffer a significant injury, loss and damage.
The majority in the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar decided on policy grounds that a patient should have a remedy in damages if the doctor breached his/her right to make a fully informed decision before consenting to treatment. The case was dealt with as a split trial and thus the basis on which damages should be assessed was not considered. The Court of Appeal's unanimous approach was that the random 1-2% risk of partial paralysis due to neurological damage which should have been the subject of the warning to Miss Chester by Mr Afshar would (statistically -98-99%) not have materialised if the surgery had been performed at another time. This is the statistical logic that supports the Australian decision of Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 and the Court of Appeal's decision 2 that Lord Walker went out of his way to criticise (see below) and which Lord Hope and Lord Steyn did not embrace.
The Facts
The claimant, Miss Chester, had suffered lumbar pain for a number of years and had been treated by a rheumatologist. He eventually advised her to take surgical advice from the defendant neurosurgeon with a view to relieving the pain. She was very unwilling to consider surgery but she did consult Mr Fari Afshar who encouraged her to have surgery on her three bulging disks but failed to warn her of the small (1-2%) inherent risk of neurological injury that could cause partial paralysis. The claimant had days later. Unfortunately, she suffered partial paralysis most probably due to non-negligent cauda equina injury (the very injury that should have been -but was not -the subject of a warning by the defendant).
Judgments
At the (split) trial, Judge Taylor decided that the operation had not been performed negligently but that the defendant surgeon had been negligent in that he had failed to warn the claimant of the 1-2% risk of serious neurological injury. He further found that if she had been so warned she would not have consented to have the operation performed three days later as happened. The claimant would have taken time to reflect on matters and would have sought further advice before she decided what to do. She did not claim that she would not have had the surgery at a later date. The risk of the injury occurring was statistically very small and also random, thus he held that on the balance of probability Miss Afshar would not have suffered the injury if the operation had taken place on another occasion (whether or not it was performed by Mr Afshar). The trial judge rejected the defendant's lawyers' argument that the claimant had suffered no damage as a result of the defendant surgeon's failure to warn because his lack of warning did not increase the risk that the injury would materialise in the future. As the claimant did not claim she would never have agreed to the surgery at some future time she had suffered no injury as a consequence of his failure to warn her.
The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the defendant's appeal. Like the majority of the House of Lords, they were apparently influenced and attracted by the line of Australian judicial authority in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (but see Lord Walker's criticism below).
Giving the first judgment of the House of Lords, Lord Bingham of Cornhill (dissenting) said that while:
"It is now, I think, generally accepted that the 'but for' test does not provide a comprehensive or exclusive test of causation in the law of tort. Sometimes, if rarely, it yields too restrictive an answer as in Fairchild. More often, applied simply and mechanically it gives too expansive an answer … But in the ordinary run of cases, satisfying the 'but for' test is a necessary if not a sufficient condition of establishing causation. Here it is not satisfied."
Lord Hoffman agreed that the claimant had failed to prove that the defendant's breach of duty had caused her loss on the basis that the failure to warn had not changed her decision to have the surgery but only the timing and that was not enough. (The previously conventional view on causation.) However, the majority, Lord Steyn, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Hope of Craighead, who all gave individual judgments, fearlessly embraced the significant policy shift on causation and dismissed the defendant surgeon's appeal.
Lord Steyn said (para 16):
"A surgeon owes a legal duty to a patient to warn him or her in general terms of possible serious risks involved in the procedure … In modern law medical paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a prima facie right to be informed by a surgeon of a small but well established risk of serious injury as a result of surgery." Lord Steyn continued:
"A patient's right to an appropriate warning from a surgeon when faced with surgery ought normatively to be regarded as an important right which must be given effective protection whenever possible."
How far we have come in twenty years from the paternalistic and doctor-protective attitudes displayed by the House of Lords in the remarkably similar case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871. In that case the surgeon was held not to have been negligent when he failed to warn the plaintiff in that case of a very similar (1-2% risk of neurological injury) before gaining her consent to lumbar surgery following which she suffered partial paralysis. It was Mrs Sidaway's case that if she had been properly warned she would have refused the surgery. Notwithstanding, Lord Hope said that the judges in Sidaway recognised as a matter of principle, the fundamental importance that must be attached to the right of the patient to decide whether he will accept or reject the treatment which is being proposed by the doctor (see paragraph 54).
Lord Steyn at paragraph 23 agreed that:
"there is no direct English authority permitting a modification of the approach to the proof of causation in a case such as the present. On the other hand, there is the analogy of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 which reveals a principled approach to such a problem."
Having considered the implications of this, Lord Steyn continues:
"Standing back from the detailed arguments, I have come to the conclusion that, as a result of the surgeon's failure to warn the patient, she cannot be said to have given informed consent to the surgery in the full legal sense. Her right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles … I am glad to have arrived at the conclusion that the claimant is entitled in law to succeed. This result is in accord with one of the most basic aspirations of the law, namely to right wrongs …"
At paragraph 81 Lord Hope said he accepted that a solution to the problem of causation which was in Miss Chester's favour could not be based on conventional causation principles:
"The 'but for' test is easily satisfied, as the trial judge held that she would not have had the operation on 21 November 1994 if the warning had been given. … The risk of which she should have been warned was not created by the failure to warn. It was already there, as an inevitable risk of the operative procedure itself."
He continued at paragraph 84:
"Did the doctor's breach of that duty (to warn) cause the patient's injury? It would appear this question can only be answered in the negative. He did nothing that increased the risk … It was a risk to which she was exposed anyway … [paragraph 85] But the issue of causation cannot be separated from issues about policy."
Lord Hope concluded at paragraph 87:
"To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the cases where it might be needed most. This would discriminate against those who cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content … On policy grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this case. The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. The duty was owed by the doctor who performed the surgery that Miss Chester consented to. It was the product of the very risk that she should have been warned about when she gave her consent. So I would hold that it can be regarded as having been caused, in the legal sense, by the breach of that duty." "If it is more likely than not that the same damage would not have been suffered then by causing her to have the operation that day he has caused her to sustain it." (See above.) Lord Walker said this:
"seems to stack the odds against the surgeon, since it compares a random misfortune which has actually and unexpectedly occurred with the statistical improbability of its occurring on one particular occasion in the future."
But he concludes at paragraph 101 that the honest claimant should not be left without a remedy even if it involves some extension of existing principle as in Fairchild. "Otherwise the surgeon's important duty would in many cases be drained of its content!" In the past "public policy" has been described as a slippery horse to ride. Our judges have leapt on it and have galloped forward without so much as a passing word on how this should be applied when it comes to calculating damages.
When assessing damages for claimants in the position of Miss Chester, should the court assume she would have had the index surgery successfully performed at a later date and reaped the hoped for benefits (as well as avoiding the injury)? As it was emphatically not the claimant's case that she would have refused the index surgery at any time in the future it cannot be right that her damages fall to be assessed on the assumption she would not have had the surgery at all. This approach will be resisted by any claimant as it is likely to produce a smaller award and requires the court to decide what, if any, alternative treatments she would probably have undergone, the resultant prognosis, her earning capacity and mobility -as compared with her actual injured state and prognosis.
Awarding damages on the assumption that the treatment would have been successfully performed at a later date is the logical consequence of applying the statistical probabilities approach that was favoured by the Court of Appeal and applied by the Australian judges in Chappel v Hart (and criticised by Lord Walker). It is consistent with the "policy" based, but cloudily reasoned, judgments of Lords Hope, Steyn and Walker and (some might feel paradoxically) will result in the same compensatory damages as if the surgery itself had been negligently performed.
Lawyers may be divided on whether they consider this House of Lords decision exemplifies the adaptability and flexibility of the common law to properly meet the public's increasing expectations of professional people -or a hard case that has made "bad" law. The two are not mutually exclusive.
